J J SINGH ON McMAHON LINE 

The McMahon Line: A Century of Discord by J.J. Singh; Published by  HarperCollins ; Pages 437; Price Rs 799 /-

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The author of the book under review Gen. J.J. Singh is  a former Indian Army Chief  whose immense  Army experience  has been  buttressed by his service in a border State  as the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh.. This has endowed him with special qualification and authority  to write on this subject.

Singh  examines the impact of geography and history in keeping the Himalayan region and Tibet isolated and autonomous for centuries and studies  the status of Tibet and her borders with China and India.He then moves on to describe the evolution of the McMahon Line and the nuances of British India’s Tibet policy from the eighteenth century up to India’s independence in 1947. The  narrative is then  focused on Sino-Indian relations during the first decade after Independence—a peaceful one, until the conflicting boundary claims emerged like a sinister monster and led to the fierce and fateful border war in October 1962 between the two nations. This war proved to be a decisive debacle for India.

What the British did to demarcate a rather contentious India-Tibet boundary and its outcome on today's India-China relations requires a plunge  into British-Indian history and a sense of geo-strategy backed by an understanding of modern day real-politick.

Singh falls back on a wealth of material culled from diverse  sources — British, Tibetan, Indian. He presents an entirely different  perspective on the events of late 1800s and the early 1900s. 

How was the McMahon line  drawn ?. It is the virtual boundary between India and China.Singh writes eloquently  about  the line and what has happened over the last century, especially the conflict during  October-November 1962 . 

Singh contends powerfully after his reading of the relevant documents  that the Chinese never had any control over what is the modern-day Arunachal Pradesh.  According to him  the Tibetan and British records  prove that  the Chinese were nibbling  at the tribal areas in the north-eastern state by conducting some excursions briefly between 1910 and 1912, but they did not  take control.. 

 An  interesting development  between 1903  and 1914 was that the British first invaded Tibet in 1903-1904 and then, following a treaty with Russia, in 1907, backed off to have a 'hands-off Tibet' policy.  China  stepped  in and  declared sovereignty over Tibet in May 1912. Noticing the Chinese probes in the Himalayas in 1910-1911, the British responded to expeditions conducted by hill tribes and warned the Chinese not to interfere in the internal matters of Tibet. The General says the British were 'compelled' to give a new shape to their policies.

In 1913–14, representatives of Britain, China, and Tibet attended a conference in  Simla and drew up an agreement concerning Tibet's status and borders. The McMahon Line, a proposed boundary between Tibet and India for the eastern sector, was drawn by British negotiator  Henry McMahon on a map attached to the agreement. All three representatives initialled the agreement, but Beijing soon objected to the proposed Sino-Tibet boundary and repudiated the agreement, refusing to sign the final, more detailed map. After approving a note which stated that China could not enjoy rights under the agreement unless she ratified it, the British and Tibetan negotiators signed the Simla Convention and more detailed map as a bilateral accord. Neville Maxwell states that McMahon had been instructed not to sign bilaterally with Tibetans if China refused, but he did so without the Chinese representative present and then kept the declaration secret.

What is the way out of the imbroglio? Gen.Singh  suggests a way out  for India and China. The boundaries are merely  a flexible cartographic expression of the British 'forward policy' with no regard  to any accepted formula  of demarcating boundaries. The General is convinced that  people on both sides (India and China) are ignorant or have inadequate knowledge of this Himalayan frontier which has pressurised decision makers on either side to adopt a rigid approach. “No straight forward or universally applicable principle can be rigidly applied,” argues the General as he suggests a rational approach in dealing with China and resolving the existing dispute.

Singh  suggests that the two countries have to make adjustments. Minor adjustments of the boundary in the uninhabitated high-altitude Himalayan wilderness would be of interest to both countries as they move towards centre stage of world affairs.

The General recalls how during the Cold War (1945-1991), the US, in a way, sided with China in 1969. The US-Soviet rivalry during the Cold war era is well documented. It remains unclear if the warning de-escalated the matter or whether it was the Cold War dynamics that sorted it. Moscow and Beijing resolved their boundary dispute in 1991 and 1994.

The boundary, disputed by India's northern neighbour, has had a profound effect on the relations between the two Asian giants, resulting most prominently in the war of 1962 but also in several skirmishes and stand-offs both before and after that. It continues to be a thorn in the side - reaching a flashpoint at the tri-junction between Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan in Doklam in 2017 .It may derail all the progress in bilateral ties if left unattended.

The British records show that the Tibetan government’s acceptance of the new border in 1914 was conditional on China accepting the Simla Convention. Since the British were not able to get an acceptance from China, Tibetans considered the McMahon line invalid. Tibetan officials continued to administer Tawang and refused to concede territory during negotiations in 1938. The Governor of Assam asserted that Tawang was "undoubtedly British" but noted that it was "controlled by Tibet, and none of its inhabitants have any idea that they are not Tibetan." During World War II, with India's east threatened by Japanese troops and with the threat of Chinese expansionism, British troops secured Tawang for extra defence.

China's claim on areas south of the McMahon Line, encompassed in the NEFA, were based on the traditional boundaries. India believes that the boundaries China proposed in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh have no written basis and no documentation exists of acceptance by anyone apart from China. Indians argue that China claims the territory on the basis that it was under Chinese imperial control in the past, while Chinese argue that India claims the territory on the basis that it was under British imperial control in the past.  India's claim line in the eastern sector follows the McMahon Line. They claimed that territory south of the high ridges here near Bhutan (as elsewhere along most of the McMahon Line) should be Indian territory and north of the high ridges should be Chinese territory. In the Indian claim, the two armies would be separated from each other by the highest mountains in the world.

Singh questions the entrenched narrative of the Chinese road construction through Aksai Chin—which in some sense triggered the events leading up to the war—as being a complete surprise, noting that India, which possessed capabilities of aerial photography, thanks to Canberra aircraft, could have sent a couple of sorties and seen all. “Was it that the unpalatable truth was being deliberately swept under the carpet?.I believe this to be the case” writes Singh.

 Singh provides a timely reminder that the borders that India and China both claim with such finality and conviction today were in 1947 and 1948 far from settled as both governments would like their people to believe—they are  imperfect legacies of a history not properly recorded .

Singh’s insightful and masterly analysis provides a landmark and definitive point in comprehending the strategic balance in the region.

P.P.Ramachandran.

14/07/2019.