SPY  CHRONICLES

The Spy Chronicles by  A.S.Dulat,Asad Durrani and Aditya Sinha; Published by  Harper Collins ; Pages 319 ;Price Rs.799/-

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There are more than a score  of books on India-Pakistan relations but the one under review is quite unusual being written by  former Research and Analysis Wing Chief AS Dulat and Lt Gen Asad Durrani, a former head of the Inter-Services Intelligence. Perhaps  the first time two men from rival spy agencies  worked closely to write a book. Two sworn enemies have come together.

This book is devised in the form of extensive dialogues on relations between India and Pakistan, as seen in the handling by these countries of the extremely sensitive issues of Kashmir, Balochistan and Afghanistan. 

 Dulat was head of R&AW from 1999 to 2000, and moved out of Atal Behari Vajpayee’s PMO in May 2004. General Assad Durrani headed ISI even earlier, from  1990 to 1991, and has been popular on the Track-2 circuit in the past decade.

With the arrival of Imran Khan  relations between New Delhi and Islamabad have reached a nadir. We are all familiar with  the fallout of the 2008 Mumbai attacks and more recent incidents such as the terror attacks in Pathankot and Uri and the surgical strikes on the LoC.

 Dulat and Durrani  held  meetings in different places during 2016-17 –  Istanbul, Kathmandu and Bangkok –  and discussed subjects like  Spying, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Terrorism,  Osama bin Laden and the inevitable Mr.Trump and the strategic developments in the States.

 The duo have spent decades protecting secrets and assets and this book does offer evidence of their penchant for secrecy.

We have a journalist Aditya Sinha who acts as a mediator for whom the book was a “journalistic assignment”. According to him  “This was a unique project. It has no great revelations, and it was more about perspective. It’s also a metaphor for the actual relationship between the two countries…Look, if the two spy chiefs can get together and talk, there’s the potential for what India and Pakistan can achieve if they do decide to talk.”

Durrani provides some interesting insights.   One is---- Pakistan “giving up (the) handle on the movement” it had created in Kashmir in the early 1990s and “letting the factions do what they bloody well wanted to”.

Two. His admission that after the 2008 Mumbai attacks that were blamed on Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, he had decided he would be available even to the Indian media to say that “whoever has done this, be it state-sponsored, ISI-sponsored, military-sponsored, should be caught hold of and punished”.

The two Intelligence Chiefs  believe  that the Pakistani military was part of the US raid that killed Al-Qaeda Chief Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad. Such a monumental  raid could not have been carried out without  Pakistan aiding and abetting.

The book  has  created ripples in both countries, especially  in Pakistan, where the 77-year-old Durrani was summoned to the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi last month to explain his position on violating the military code of conduct and later had a formal court of inquiry instituted against him.

 Durrani has declared that the agenda for the book was inspired by what India’s former Vice President Hamid Ansari once said to him: “Yeh dewaangi kaab khatam hogi? (When will this madness end?)”.“We need to move forward, talk about things that are doable. There’s no point endlessly squabbling about things,” says Dulat. “This book is about looking at how even issues like Kashmir can be a bridge.”

 Durrani admits that his biggest failure as ISI chief was when the separatist movement in the Kashmir Valley started in 1990: “The biggest failure was that when the Kashmir uprising happened, we did not know how far it would go. These things usually run their course in six months or a year. When it became lasting, we wondered how to keep a handle on it. We didn’t want it to go out of control, which could lead to a war that neither side wanted. Could we micro-manage it? That was our challenge. ISI’s leverage on the Kashmir insurgency turned out less than successful.”

Durrani also doesn’t have a high opinion of the American CIA, having worked closely with them during the first Afghan War.

The ISI has a gained a larger-than-life image globally, courtesy its portrayal in the Western media following the American involvement in Afghanistan. The R&AW does not generate the same reputation  and is not seen to be as sinister as the ISI.

While Dulat maintains that the ISI is the better intelligence organisation because of its influence, Durrani feels that R&AW has an advantage because it has career intelligence officers, unlike the ISI, which has military officers. 

 Nevertheless, the issues dealt with here remain “live”, and are of high volatility and great public interest. If that weren’t so, the book will be of interest chiefly to historians. The manner of the conversation here suggests that the participants are well versed with the subjects they deal with even after their retirement. 

Extremely frank estimates are also offered of some CIA chiefs and of the US approach generally for South and West Asia. Issues such as India’s surgical strike, the Kulbhushan Jadhav case, the failed Agra talks and the changing matrix in Afghanistan have been examined most thoroughly. 

The role of the Pakistan military in taking over Pakistan, and the impact of this on Kashmir, is glossed over. Gen. Durrani says laconically that if the State in Pakistan had not intervened, other non-state actors would have filled the breach. This is frightening, but hardly simplistic. 

Dulat and Durrani both seem to think that making former J&K chief minister Farooq Abdullah the Centre’s interlocutor for Kashmir on Pakistan’s recommendation may be a great idea. 

In a sense, these former spy chiefs have a progressive worldview insofar as interactions among nations go.

Perhaps military men and politicians should follow what is written in the book in the interest of a calmer future.  It is a reasonable  account of how a healthy system of cooperation between the intelligence agencies and the government can help or hinder the formulation of domestic and foreign policies that benefit the public.

What comes across in the conversation is the warmth of their friendship. Both the Intelligence Chiefs have faith in people-to-people contacts. They share a passion for cricket, the Punjabi language and a common north Indian culture. They agree that it takes only 35 minutes to travel from Lahore to Delhi — a classic case of so near yet so far. Dulat’s breadth of experience with Kashmir is well recognised, and his dialogue with General Durrani about this sensitive issue forms the crucial part  of the book, with the duo discussing Musharraf’s ‘Four point initiatives’ and India’s lacklustre response to them, how the “back channels only soft pedalled” and how Pakistan views Kashmir as unreliable territory.

   Pakistan’s military barred the former intelligence chief  Durrani from leaving the country and ordered an investigation into whether he violated the military’s code of conduct by writing the book.Several Pakistani civilian leaders have questioned Mr. Durrani’s actions and statements attributed in the book. “It is shocking that on one hand Pakistan and India relations are at an all-time low and on the other hand, former spy chiefs of both the countries are teaming up to write a book,”.

 We have an unusual volume here where extremely well informed individuals have spoken with ease. Perhaps military men and politicians should follow what is written in the book in the interest of a calmer future.

P.P.Ramachandran.

6/1/2019.